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Abstract
This is a report for reproducibility challenge of NeurlIPS’19 on the paper Com-
petitive gradient descent (Schäfer et al., 2019). The paper introduces a novel algo-
rithm for the numerical computation of Nash equilibria of competitive two-player
games. It avoids oscillatory and divergent behaviors seen in alternating gradient
descent.
The purpose of this report is to critically examine the reproducibility of the
work by (Schäfer et al., 2019), within the framework of the NeurIPS 2019 Re-
producibility Challenge. The experiments replicated in this report confirms the
results of the original study. Moreover, this project offers a Python(Pytorch
based) implementation of the proposed CGD algorithm which can be found at
the following public git repository: (https://github.com/GopiKishan14/
Reproducibility_Challenge_NeurIPS_2019)
1 Introduction and Motivation
The original paper introduces a new algorithm for the numerical computation of Nash equilibria of
competitive two-player games. Authors suggest their method is a natural generalization of gradient
descent to the two-player scenario where the update is given by the Nash equilibrium of a regularized
bilinear local approximation of the underlying game. It avoids oscillatory and divergent behaviors
seen in alternating gradient descent.
The paper proposes several experiments to establish the robustness of their method. This project
aims at replicating their results.
The paper provides a detailed comparison to methods based on optimism and consensus on the
properties of convergence and stability of various discussed methods using numerical experiments
and rigorous analysis.
In order to understand these terms, comparison and proposed method and examine the results of the
experiments, next section gives a necessary background of the original paper.
2 Background
The traditional optimization is concerned with a single agent trying to optimize a cost function. It
can be seen as minx∈Rm f(x). The agent has a clear objective to find (“Good local”) minimum of
f . Gradeint Descent (and its varients) are reliable Algorithmic Baseline for this purpose.
Preprint. Under review.
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The paper talks about Competitive optimization. Competitive optimization extends this problem
to the setting of multiple agents each trying to minimize their own cost function, which in general
depends on the actions of all agents.
The paper deals with the case of two such agents:
min
x∈Rm
f(x, y), min
y∈Rn
g(x, y) (1)
for two functions f, g : Rm × Rn −→ R.
In single agent optimization, the solution of the problem consists of the minimizer of the cost func-
tion. In competitive optimization, the right definition of solution is less obvious, but often one is
interested in computing Nash– or strategic equilibria: Pairs of strategies, such that no player can
decrease their costs by unilaterally changing their strategies. If f and g are not convex, finding a
global Nash equilibrium is typically impossible and instead we hope to find a "good" local Nash
equilibrium.
Gradient descent/ascent and the cycling problem: For differentiable objective functions, the most
naive approach to solving (1) is gradient descent ascent (GDA), whereby both players independently
change their strategy in the direction of steepest descent of their cost function. Unfortunately, this
procedure features oscillatory or divergent behavior even in the simple case of a bilinear game
(f(x, y) = x>y = −g(x, y)) (see Figure 3). In game-theoretic terms, GDA lets both players
choose their new strategy optimally with respect to the last move of the other player. Thus, the
cycling behaviour of GDA is not surprising: It is the analogue of "Rock! Paper! Scissors! Rock!
Paper! Scissors! Rock! Paper!..." in the eponymous hand game. While gradient descent is a reliable
basic workhorse for single-agent optimization, GDA can not play the same role for competitive
optimization. At the moment, the lack of such a workhorse greatly hinders the broader adoption of
methods based on competition.
2.1 Competitive gradient descent
Authors propose a novel algorithm, which they call competitive gradient descent (CGD), for the
solution of competitive optimization problems minx∈Rm f(x, y), miny∈Rn g(x, y), where they have
access to function evaluations, gradients, and Hessian-vector products of the objective functions. 1
Algorithm 1: Competitive Gradient Descent (CGD)
for 0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 do
xk+1 = xk − η
(
Id−η2D2xyfD2yxg
)−1 (∇xf − ηD2xyf∇yg);
yk+1 = yk − η
(
Id−η2D2yxgD2xyf
)−1 (∇yg − ηD2yxg∇xf);
return (xN , yN );
To motivate this algorithm, authors remind us that gradient descent with stepsize η applied to the
function f : Rm −→ R can be written as
xk+1 = argminx∈Rm(x
> − x>k )∇xf(xk) +
1
2η
‖x− xk‖2.
This models a (single) player solving a local linear approximation of the (minimization) game, sub-
ject to a quadratic penalty that expresses her limited confidence in the global accuracy of the model.
The natural generalization of this idea to the competitive case should then be given by the two play-
ers solving a local approximation of the true game, both subject to a quadratic penalty that expresses
their limited confidence in the accuracy of the local approximation.
In order to implement this idea, we need to find the appropriate way to generalize the linear approx-
imation in the single agent setting to the competitive setting.
Authors suggest to use a bilinear approximation in the two-player setting. Since the bilinear ap-
proximation is the lowest order approximation that can capture some interaction between the two
players, they argue that the natural generalization of gradient descent to competitive optimization
1Here and in the following, all derivatives are evaluated in the point (xk, yk)
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is not GDA, but rather the update rule (xk+1, yk+1) = (xk, yk) + (x, y), where (x, y) is a Nash
equilibrium of the game 2
min
x∈Rm
x>∇xf + x>D2xyfy + y>∇yf +
1
2η
x>x
min
y∈Rn
y>∇yg + y>D2yxgx+ x>∇xg +
1
2η
y>y.
(2)
Indeed, the (unique) Nash equilibrium of the Game (2) can be computed in closed form.
Theorem 2.1. Among all (possibly randomized) strategies with finite first moment, the only Nash
equilibrium of the Game (2) is given by
x = −η (Id−η2D2xyfD2yxg)−1 (∇xf − ηD2xyf∇yg)
y = −η (Id−η2D2yxgD2xyf)−1 (∇yg − ηD2yxg∇xf) ,
given that the matrix inverses in the above expression exist. 3
An elegant proof of the above theorem is presented in the original paper (Schäfer et al., 2019).
According to Theorem 2.1, the Game (2) has exactly one optimal pair of strategies, which is deter-
ministic. Thus, we can use these strategies as an update rule, generalizing the idea of local optimality
from the single– to the multi agent setting and obtaining Algorithm 1.
What I think that they think that I think ... that they do: Another game-theoretic interpretation
of CGD follows from the observation that its update rule can be written as(
∆x
∆y
)
= −
(
Id ηD2xyf
ηD2yxg Id
)−1(∇xf
∇yg
)
.
Applying the expansion λmax(A) < 1⇒ (Id−A)−1 = limN→∞
∑N
k=0A
k to the above equation,
we observe that:
• The first partial sum (N = 0) corresponds to the optimal strategy if the other player’s
strategy stays constant (GDA).
• The second partial sum (N = 1) corresponds to the optimal strategy if the other player
thinks that the other player’s strategy stays constant (LCGD, see Figure 1).
• The third partial sum (N = 2) corresponds to the optimal strategy if the other player thinks
that the other player thinks that the other player’s strategy stays constant, and so forth, until
the Nash equilibrium is recovered in the limit.
2.2 Comparison with other methods
As illustrated in Figure 1, these six algorithms amount to different subsets of the following four
terms.
1. The gradient term −∇xf , ∇yf which corresponds to the most immediate way in which
the players can improve their cost.
2. The competitive term −Dxyf∇yf , Dyxf∇xf which can be interpreted either as antici-
pating the other player to use the naive (GDA) strategy, or as decreasing the other players
influence (by decreasing their gradient).
3. The consensus term ±D2xx∇xf , ∓D2yy∇yf that determines whether the players prefer to
decrease their gradient (± = +) or to increase it (± = −). The former corresponds the
players seeking consensus, whereas the latter can be seen as the opposite of consensus.
(It also corresponds to an approximate Newton’s method. 4)
2We could alternatively use the penalty (x>x+y>y)/(2η) for both players, without changing the solution.
3We note that the matrix inverses exist for all but one value of η, and for all η in the case of a zero sum
game.
4Applying a damped and regularized Newton’s method to the optimization problem of Player 1 would
amount to choosing xk+1 = xk−η(Id+ηD2xx)−1f∇xf ≈ xk−η(∇xf−ηD2xxf∇xf), for ‖ηD2xxf‖  1.
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GDA: ∆x = −∇xf
LCGD: ∆x = −∇xf − ηD2xyf∇yf
SGA: ∆x = −∇xf − γD2xyf∇yf
ConOpt: ∆x = −∇xf − γD2xyf∇yf − γD2xxf∇xf
OGDA: ∆x ≈ −∇xf − ηD2xyf∇yf + ηD2xxf∇xf
CGD: ∆x =
(
Id +η2D2xyfD
2
yxf
)−1 (−∇xf − ηD2xyf∇yf )
Figure 1: The update rules of the first player for (from top to bottom) GDA, LCGD, ConOpt,
OGDA, and CGD, in a zero-sum game (f = −g).
4. The equilibrium term (Id +η2D2xyD
2
yxf)
−1, (Id +η2D2yxD
2
xyf)
−1, which arises from the
players solving for the Nash equilibrium. This term lets each player prefer strategies that
are less vulnerable to the actions of the other player.
Further Discussion:
Consensus optimization (ConOpt) (Mescheder et al., 2017), penalises the players for
non-convergence by adding the squared norm of the gradient at the next location,
γ‖∇xf(xk+1, yk+1),∇xf(xk+1, yk+1)‖2 to both pla yer’s loss function (here γ ≥ 0 is a
hyperparameter).
(Daskalakis et al., 2017) proposed to modify GDA as
∆x = − (∇xf(xk, yk) + (∇xf(xk, yk)−∇xf(xk−1, yk−1)))
∆y = − (∇yg(xk, yk) + (∇yg(xk, yk)−∇yg(xk−1, yk−1))) ,
which we will refer to as optimistic gradient descent ascent (OGDA). By interpreting the differ-
ences appearing in the update rule as finite difference approximations to Hessian vector products,
we see that (to leading order) OGDA corresponds to yet another second order correction of GDA
(see Figure 1).
It will also be instructive to compare the algorithms to linearized competitive gradient descent
(LCGD), which is obtained by skipping the matrix inverse in CGD (which corresponds to taking
only the leading order term in the limit ηD2xyf → 0).
3 Experiments and Replications
This section contains the contribution from this project and defines the experiment.
A link to public Github repository (https://github.com/GopiKishan14/Reproducibility_
Challenge_NeurIPS_2019) describes the implementation details of Competitive Gradient De-
scent.
A brief discussion on the implementation of CGD by Authors.
Computing Hessian vector products: First, our algorithm requires products of the mixed Hessian
v 7→ Dxyfv, v 7→ Dyxgv, which we want to compute using automatic differentiation.
Many AD frameworks, like Autograd (https://github.com/HIPS/autograd) and Forward-
Diff(https://github.com/JuliaDiff/ForwardDiff.jl, (Revels et al., 2016)) together with
ReverseDiff(https://github.com/JuliaDiff/ReverseDiff.jl) support this procedure.
Matrix inversion for the equilibrium term: Similar to a truncated Newton’s method (Nocedal
and Wright, 2006), we propose to use iterative methods to approximate the inverse-matrix vector
products arising in the equilibrium term 4. We will focus on zero-sum games, where the matrix is
always symmetric positive definite, making the conjugate gradient (CG) algorithm the method of
choice. We suggest terminating the iterative solver after a given relative decrease of the residual is
achieved (‖Mx − y‖ ≤ ‖x‖ for a small parameter , when solving the system Mx = y). In our
4
experiments we choose  = 10−6. Given the strategy ∆x of one player, ∆y is the optimal counter
strategy which can be found without solving another system of equations.
3.1 Experiment 1
The author suggest that each of the terms (section 2.2) used in the definition of the algorithm is
responsible for a different feature of the corresponding algorithm which can illustrated by applying
the algorithms to three prototypical test cases.
1. Test Case 1: We first consider the bilinear problem f(x, y) = αxy (see Figure 3).
Replication and Findings: As suggested, GDA fails on this problem, for any value of
stepsize η.
For α = 1.0, all the other methods converge exponentially towards the equilibrium, with
ConOpt and SGA converging at a faster rate.
For α = 3.0, OGDA diverges, while ConvOpt and SGA begin to oscillate widely.
For α = 6.0, all methods but CGD diverge. This result is compared and summed up in
Figure (3)
However, for α = 3.0, if we decrease γ to 0.5 ConOpt and SGA converges. ConOpt and
SGA does not converge for any value of γ if α = 6.0. Figure 4 Left.
For α = 6.0, if stepsize η is increased to η = 0.9, CGD converges faster. Hence, estab-
lishing the claim that CGD convergence rate increases with increase in stepsize η. Figure
4 Middle.
Interestingly, CGD fails for the problem if initial points set on y = 5/3x for α = 3.0 and
η = 0.2. But LCGD still converges. Figure (4) Right.
2. Test case 2: In order to explore the effect of the consensus Term 3, we now consider the
convex-concave problem f(x, y) = α(x2 − y2) (see Figure 6).
Replication and Findings: For α = 1.0, all algorithms converge at an exponential rate,
with ConOpt converging the fastest, and OGDA the slowest.
As we increase α to α = 3.0, the OGDA and ConOpt start failing (diverge), while the
remaining algorithms still converge at an exponential rate. Upon increasing α further to
α = 6.0, all algorithms diverge. (See Figure 6)
Figure 7 shows the robustness of CGD, while other methods can also be tuned for conver-
gance at α = 3.0 and η = 0.2 on decreasing γ.
3. Test case 3: We further investigate the effect of the consensus Term 3 by considering the
concave-convex problem f(x, y) = α(−x2 + y2) (see Figure 6).
Replication and Findings: The critical point (0, 0) does not correspond to a Nash-
equilibrium, since both players are playing their worst possible strategy. Thus it is highly
undesirable for an algorithm to converge to this critical point.
However for α = 1.0, ConOpt does converge to (0, 0) which provides an example of the
consensus regularization introducing spurious solutions. The other algorithms, instead,
diverge away towards infinity, as would be expected. In particular, we see that SGA is
correcting the problematic behavior of ConOpt, while maintaining its better convergence
rate in the first example. As we increase α to α ∈ {3.0, 6.0}, the radius of attraction of
(0, 0) under ConOpt decreases and thus ConOpt diverges from the starting point (0.5, 0.5),
as well. (See Figure 6)
Figure 8 shows the robustness of CGD, while ConOpt can also be tuned for convergence at
α = 1.0 and η = 0.2 on decreasing γ γ ∈ {1.0, 0.5, 0.2} (divergence desired).
Conclusion: The first test case illustrates that this is not just a lack of theory, but corresponds to an
actual failure mode of the existing algorithms. Introducing the competitive term (2) is enough to fix
the cycling behaviour of GDA, OGDA and ConOpt (for small enough η).
In the Test Case 2 (where convergence is desired), OGDA converges in a smaller parameter range
than GDA and SGA, while only diverging slightly faster in the Test Case 3 (where divergence is
desired). ConOpt, on the other hand, converges faster than GDA in the Test Case 2, for α = 1.0
however, it diverges faster for the remaining values of α and, what is more problematic, it converges
to a spurious solution in the Test Case 3 for α = 1.0.
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Figure 2: Original Paper Result
Figure 3: Replicated Result: The first 50 iterations of GDA, LCGD, ConOpt, OGDA, and CGD with
parameters η = 0.2 and γ = 1.0. The objective function is f(x, y) = αx>y for, from left to right,
α ∈ {1.0, 3.0, 6.0}. (Note that ConOpt and SGA coincide on a bilinear problem)
Figure 4: Results for Experiment 3.1 Test 1. (Refer to the part for explanation)
Based on the findings of Test Case 2 and 3, the consensus term (3) with either sign does not seem to
systematically improve the performance of the algorithm (see Fig 7 and 8), which is why the authors
suggest to only use the competitive term (that is, use LOLA/LCGD, or CGD, or SGA).
Figure 5: Original Paper result
Figure 6: Replicated result: We measure the (non-)convergence to equilibrium in the separable
convex-concave– (f(x, y) = α(x2 − y2), left three plots) and concave convex problem (f(x, y) =
α(−x2 + y2), right three plots), for α ∈ {1.0, 3.0, 6.0}. (Color coding given by GDA, SGA,
LCGD, CGD, ConOpt, OGDA, the y-axis measures log10(‖(xk, yk)‖) and the x-axis the number of
iterations k. Note that convergence is desired for the first problem, while divergence is desired for
the second problem.
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Figure 7: Results for Experiment 3.1 Test 2. Shows the robustness of CGD, while other methods
can also be tuned for convergence at α = 3.0 and η = 0.2 on decreasing γ. (convergence desired)
Figure 8: Results for Experiment 3.1 Test 3. Shows the robustness of CGD, while ConOpt can also
be tuned for convergence at α = 1.0 and η = 0.2 on decreasing γ.. γ ∈ {1.0, 0.5, 0.2} (divergence
desired)
3.2 Experiment 2: Estimating a covariance matrix
To show that CGD is also competitive in terms of computational complexity, authors consider the
noiseless case of the covariance estimation example used by Daskalakis et al. (2017).
Authors consider the problem −g(V,W ) = f(W,V ) = ∑ijkWij (Σˆij − (V ΣˆV >)i,j), where
the Σˆ are empirical covariance matrices obtained from samples distributed according to N (0,Σ).
For the experiments, the matrix Σ is created as Σ = UUT , where the entries of U ∈ Rd×d are
distributed i.i.d. standard Gaussian.
Replication and Findings: As described in the original paper, this project considers the algorithms
OGDA, SGA, ConOpt, and CGD for deterministic case Σˆ = Σ, corresponding to the limit of large
sample size, with γ = 1.0,  = 10−6. Let dimensions of Σ, d ∈ {20, 40, 60} and let the stepsizes
range over η ∈ {0.005, 0.025, 0.1, 0.4}.
Authors suggest to evaluate the algorithms according to the trade-off between the number of for-
ward evaluations and the corresponding reduction of the residual ‖W + W>‖FRO/2 + ‖UU> −
V V >‖FRO, starting with a random initial guess (the same for all algorithms) obtained asW1 = δW ,
V1 = U + δV , where the entries of δW, δV are i.i.d uniformly distributed in [−0.5, 0.5]. Authors
count the number of "forward passes" per outer iteration as follows.
• OGDA: 2
• SGA: 4
• ConOpt: 6
• CGD: 4 + 2 ∗ number of CG iterations
The results are summarized in Figure 9 and Figure 10. We see consistently that for the same stepsize,
CGD has convergence rate comparable to that of OGDA. However, as we increase the stepsize the
other methods start diverging, thus allowing CGD to achieve significantly better convergence rates
by using larger stepsizes. For larger dimensions (d ∈ {40, 60}) OGDA, SGA, and ConOpt become
even more unstable such that OGDA with the smallest stepsize is the only other method that still
converges, although at a much slower rate than CGD with larger stepsizes.
Conclusion : On studying the tradeoff between the number of evaluations of the forward model and
the residual, this project supports that larger stepsize, the convergence rate of CGD is better than
7
Figure 9: Original Paper result:
Figure 10: Replication result: Plot of the decay of the residual after a given number of model
evaluations, for increasing problem sizes and η ∈ {0.005, 0.025, 0.1, 0.4}.
the other methods and for comparable stepsize, the convergence rate of CGD is similar to the other
methods.
3.3 Experiment 3: Fitting a bimodal distribution
To further study the robustness of the CGD, authors propose to use a simple GAN to fit a Gaussian
mixture model with two modes, in two dimensions.
Replication and Findings We use a GAN to fit a Gaussian mixture of two Gaussian random
variables with means µ1 = (0, 1)> and µ2 = (2−1/2, 2−1/2)>, and standard deviation σ = 0.1
Generator and discriminator are given by dense neural nets with four hidden layers of 128 units
each that are initialized as orthonormal matrices, and ReLU as nonlinearities after each hidden
layer. The generator uses 512-variate standard Gaussian noise as input, and both networks use a
linear projection as their final layer. At each step, the discriminator is shown 256 real, and 256 fake
examples. We interpret the output of the discriminator as a logit and use sigmoidal crossentropy as
a loss function.The results are summarized in Figure 11 and Figure 12.
We apply SGA, ConOpt (γ = 1.0), OGDA, and CGD for stepsize η ∈ {0.4, 0.1, 0.025, 0.005}
together with RMSProp (ρ = 0.9). In each case, CGD produces an reasonable approximation of
the input distribution without any mode collapse. In contrast, all other methods diverge after some
initial cycling behaviour.
Conclusion : On all methods, the generator and discriminator are initially chasing each other across
the strategy space, producing the typical cycling pattern. When using SGA, ConOpt, or OGDA,
however, eventually the algorithm diverges with the generator either mapping all the mass far away
from the mode, or collapsing the generating map to become zero. Therefore, we also tried decreasing
the stepsize to 0.001, which however did not prevent the divergence. For CGD, after some initial
cycles the generator starts splitting the mass and distributes is roughly evenly among the two modes.
This project supports authors’ claim that CGD is significantly more robust than existing methods
for competitive optimization.
4 Conclusion and Acknowledgement
This project mostly successfully replicates the work of original paper. It supports the properties
of introduced Competitive Gradient Descent method for Competitive optimization through the pro-
posed experiments. The three experiments test different aspects of the algorithms. Experiment 1
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Figure 11: Original Paper result:
Figure 12: Replication result: Under CGD, the mass eventually distributes evenly among the two
modes.
is based on removal of cyclic behaviour and importance of different definition terms. It also tests
convergence/divergence of the algorithms on different zero-sum games. Experiment 2 evaluates and
compares computational complexity of the CGDA w.r.t other algorithms. Experiment 3 studies the
robustness of CGDA by fitting bimodal distribution using GAN.
This project acknowledges the code of the original paper written in Julia used for replication. The
original paper describes the experiments very well and their code is also very understandable. It
also acknowledges the support of Code Ocean for providing compute resources and prof. Debasish
Ghose, Department of Aerospace Engineering, Indian Institute of Science.
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